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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1997 novel The Wrath of God, Chinese entrepreneur
Sun Qi escapes to the United States and forms the Pan-American
Investment Group. 1
This business specializes in the mass
production of forged documents: work records detailing at least
two years of management experience, business licenses,
certificates confirming the applicant has no criminal record, and
university diplomas. 2 The firm charges each client twenty
thousand dollars for a set of these documents that qualify the
alien for an L-1 non-immigrant visa.8 In this Chinese novel, a
lawyer working with the Pan-American Investment Group
explained that using the L visa as a tool for illegal immigration to
the United States is big business:
We spend no more than 2,000 U.S. dollars on each applicant For
each new immigrant we can make 18,000 U.S. dollars, which
means 180,000 U.S. dollars for ten, 1.8 million U.S. dollars for

100. How much can 10,000 or 100,000 bring in? ...

With an

input-output ratio of one to ten, what other business has a profit
4
margin higher than this?

Congress created the L visa in

1970 to encourage

international companies to transfer foreign talent and investment
to the United States.5 These multinational businesses needed a
quick and flexible method to transfer business personnel to the
United States. 6 However, in attempting to meet the legitimate
needs of transnational companies, Congress unintentionally
7
crafted a malleable visa vulnerable to fraud.
Although fictional, The Wrath of God accurately depicts how
transnational criminal organizations exploit the provisions of the

1.
See Novel Describes Systematic Political Corruptior Part 2 BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADcASTs, July 5, 1997, at Part. 3, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
2.
See id.
3.
See id4.
See id.
5.
See Pub. L. No. 91-225, 84 Stat. 116 (1970) (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15), 1182(e), 1184).
6.
See infra Part III.
7.
The immigration system has 2 parts: immigration and nonimmigration. See infra note 36. For clarity, the term "immigration system"
includes reference to both parts. The term "immigration" or "non-immigration"
will refer to the sub-units.
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L-1 non-immigrant visa as a method for illegal immigration. The
problem in China is especially severe; government investigations
have revealed that in some provinces, between eighty and ninety
percent of all L visa applications are fraudulent, and many are
8
from companies that only exist on paper.
In May 1997, Congress examined the "notoriously porous" L
visa in a series of hearings on visa fraud before the Subcommittee
on immigration and Claims. 9 In his opening statement, Chairman
Lamar Smith stated that visa fraud posed "severe and increasing
risks to the integrity of our immigration system."1 0
This Note examines why the L visa is particularly vulnerable
to multinational fraud and proposes both a domestic and an
international solution to combat this abuse. Part II of this Note
addresses the governmental policies behind the L visa. This
section provides an overview of the origins of the transnational
company and discusses the reasons why Congress created the L
visa to meet the needs of this specialized segment of international
business.
Part III analyzes the bifurcated approval process for an L
visa. This section surveys the requirements for the L visa and
discusses why Congress believed these requirements were an
adequate safeguard against abuse. Part III also examines why the
traditional check on the immigration process, consulate review, is
largely ineffective to detect and deter fraudulent L visa
applications.
Part IV of this Note analyzes how transnational criminal
organizations, most notably Russian and Chinese units, use the L
visa as a method of illegal immigration. This section details the
prototypical L visa scheme and discusses how criminal
organizations exploit the flexible provisions of the L visa to
perpetuate these fraudulent practices.
Part V proposes a two-part solution to L visa fraud. First, the
INS and the State Department need to close existing loopholes in
the L visa through better methods of detection of criminal
applicants and punishment of offenders.
Second, the United
States should sign a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with both
Russia and China. This treaty would allow the United States to

8.
See William Branigin, Immigration Fraud Schemes ProliferatingInside
the U.S., WASH. PosT, May 19, 1997, atA4.
9.
See id.
10.
Visa Fraud and Benefit Application Fraud: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,105th

Cong. 1 (1997) (opening statement of Chairman Lamar Smith) [hereinafter Smith
Opening Statement].
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work together with these countries to eliminate the organized
criminal networks perpetuating these large-scale fraud schemes.

II. THE EMERGING GLOBAL ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON

U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
Traditional U.S. immigration policy has sought to protect the
U.S. worker by severely limiting employment opportunities for
foreign nationals.1 1 However, the growing importance of
philosophy. 12
this
challenges
corporations
transnational
Transnational companies need a flexible immigration policy to
allow for critical interaction between company employees and the
immediate transfer of personnel to adjust to shifting labor
patterns. 1 3 Because of the increasing significance of the
multinational company, the proper goals for U.S. immigration
policy must be re-examined within the context of the international
business climate.1 4 An unduly restrictive business immigration
system could severely limit the ability of U.S. companies to
compete in the global marketplace.
A. The Importanceof the TransnationalCompany
in the InternationalBusiness Community
The Transnational Corporation (TNC) is a multinational
organization with a unified structure, collective control, and a
common strategy.1 5 The TNC is largely the product of the post-

11.
See Maria Isabel Medina, The Cr'ninalization of Immigration Law:
Employer Sanctions and MarriageFraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 676 (1997)
(arguing that the core of American immigration policy is the philosophy that the
United States may regulate entry and exit through its borders for the benefit of its
citizens). Toward that end, in 1986 Congress criminalized the employment of
illegal aliens in order to deter unauthorized entry and offer better employment
opportunities for U.S. workers. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
12.
See generally Peter Hansen & Victoria Aranda, An Emerging
InternationalFrameworkfor TransnationalCorporations,14 FoRDHAM INTL L.J. 881
(1991) (arguing that an international framework is necessary for the full
development of the global economy). The characteristics of the global economy
include: free trade in goods, capital and services; loosening of regulations
governing foreign investment; elimination of exchange controls; rapid movement
of capital across national boundaries; and a shift in economic power from
resource-based to knowledge based economies. See John Hogarth, Developments
in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Bribery of Officials in Pursuit of Corporate
Aims, 6 CRIM L.F. 557, 561 (1995).
13.
See Austin T. Fragomen, Impact of U.S. Immigration Law Based Upon
InternationalBusiness, 16 CAN. U.S. L. J. 29,31.
14
See id. at 30.
15.
See Hansen & Aranda, supranote 12, at 882.
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World War II economy and its emergence has led to a revolution
in business patterns and a high level of globalization in the world
economy.16 TNCs account for about eighty percent of United
States international trade, of which approximately forty percent is
intracompany trade. 17
Globalization is now recognized as a
"critical component for any new business."18 Therefore, the
importance of TNCs can only be expected to increase.
TNCs engage in a different type of business transaction than
traditional
international
businesses.19
The
conventional
international business deal, between two separate companies
incorporated in different countries, involves a one time
transaction at the border.2 0 In contrast, TNCs presuppose a long
term relationship with the host country. 2 ' Because of continuous

contact with the host country, TNCs require different instruments
22
for business transactions, trade, and monetary matters.

B. The Conflict Between TransnationalCompanies and
TraditionalU.S. ImmigrationPolicy
To achieve success in a global economy, multinational
corporations must have the ability to move personnel freely within
their organizations. 2 3 Putting the best manager or the most
expert technician in the right branch of the TNC, "is an absolute
requirement to assure that a business stays even with, or ahead

16.

See id. at 881.

17.

See id. The growing importance of TNCs is illustrated by the U.N. Code

of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. See icl. at 886 (citing U.N. CONF. ON
TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), DRAFT INT'L CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECH.,

U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990)). The Code covers standards for TNCs and well as
policies for the host countries. See id. The Code recognizes that sovereign
jurisdictions have the right to control business within their borders, but also
recognizes the need for consistency across national borders.
See id. The
umbrella clause of the Code advocates the use of international law as the
measure for the treatment of TNCs. See id
18.
See Hearing on Draft Proposalsfor the ImmigrationAct of 1995 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th
Cong. (1995), available in 1995 WL 10731922 (prepared testimony of Austin T.
Fragomen) [hereinafter Fragomen Testimony].
19.
See Hansen & Aranda, supranote 12, at 882.

20.

See id.

21.

See Id.

22.
23.

See id.
See Fragomen, supranote 13, at 31 (arguing that rapid technological

shifts make it increasingly difficult to precisely pinpoint the areas where training

and education are necessary, and, therefore, that the multinational company
needs to access personnel in other countries, who may already possess this
knowledge, to fill specialized positions).
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of well-financed and highly efficient overseas competitors."2 4 A
flexible immigration policy allows the company to attract the best
employees by promising advancement
within the organization
25
without regard to nationality.
A favorable business immigration system also permits a
company to fill positions caused by temporary labor shortages in
any one country. 26 This need is particularly evident in the
science and technology industries, as approximately fifty percent
of graduates of Ph.D. programs at U.S. universities are foreign
nationals. 27 One business commentator has noted that "itis
virtually impossible to adequately staff a major . . . corporate

research facility without recruiting foreign nationals from U.S.
universities or directly from abroad."28
Furthermore, the international exchange of personnel leads
to a cross-fertilization of ideas among highly skilled employees.
Penetrating a foreign market requires employees with specialized
knowledge of the customs and preferences of the people who
comprise that market.2 9 Through contact with foreign workers,
U.S. employees gain a better understanding of the various
cultures of the international market.3 0 The foreign employee
returns to his home country with a positive impression of the
United States and an increased knowledge of the methods,
31
procedures, and culture of the company or firm.
The need of multinational businesses to freely transfer
personnel between offices directly conflicts with established U.S.
immigration policy. This policy has, in an effort to protect the
unemployed U.S. worker, sought to discourage U.S. companies
from hiring foreign individuals.3 2 Most significantly, in order to
hire a foreign worker, most U.S. companies have in the past had
to satisfy a cumbersome labor certification process through the
Department of Labor and prove that no qualified U.S. workers
were available for the position. 3
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
See House Report, infranote 37, at 2752.
See Fragomen, supranote 13, at 29.
See id. at 30.

31.
32.

See id.
at 30.
See id. at 32. Ironically, the group Congress most wanted to protect,

Id.
See id. at 29.
See id.

low-skilled American workers, are least protected by this legislation. By favoring
immigrants with family

ties over immigrants with specific skills the result has

been to give an unintentional preference to low or unskilled foreign workers. See
id!
33.

Under the Labor Certification program, an employer must either prove

(1) the alien will occupy a job for which there is a proven shortage of American

workers (examples include: physicians in rural areas, persons in the arts, and
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This restrictive policy
hindering the ability of U.S.
workers and limiting the
wishing to establish branch
commentator noted, the

acted as a trade barrier, severely
companies to attract talented foreign
opportunities for foreign companies
offices in the United States.34 As one

[b]usiness community can do little to control exchange rates or the
extent of foreign government restrictions on trade, but it must do
all it can to assure efficiency in business operations and the
optimal dedication of personnel resources to respond to market
demands . . . [C]ompanies need immigration laws that 3 provide
5
maximum flexibility in planning and minimum time delays.

Before 1970, the United States lacked a flexible program that
would allow businesses to bring foreign personnel to this country
to occupy temporarily a significant position within the corporation
or to start a new branch of a foreign parent company.3 6 Instead,
the foreign national had to qualify under the rigid standards of
either the H or the3 8J visa.3 7 Neither was particularly suited to the
needs of the TNC.
The H visa allows a company to transfer an employee to this
country for a limited period of time to occupy a temporary
position.3 9 However, this visa strictly defines "temporary position"
as one with a definite starting and ending date. 4 ° For example, a

certified physical therapists or nurses) or (2) the alien will occupy a position for
See Labor
which no American worker is available at the prevailing wage.
Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20
C.F.R. § 656 (1998).

34.

See Lance Director Nagel et al., Rethinking Immigration to FurtherGlobal

Trade, REcORDER, July 8, 1994, at 29, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS
File. Without a global system for transnational business, corporations are
prevented from "pursu[ing] the true logic of the global economy." Hansen &
Aranda, supranote 11, at 882 (citations omitted). The result is that international
corporations have less control over their operations and the entire enterprise is
unable to function as a unit. See id.
Fragomen, supranote 13, at 31.
35.
36.
United States immigration law establishes two categories for foreign
nationals who wish to move to, move in, or travel to this country. See Paul. T.
Wangerin, A Beginner's Guide to Business-Related Aspects of United States
Immigration Law, 5 Nw. J. INTI L. & Bus. 844, 848 (1983). "Non-immigrants"
include those persons who will stay in the United States for a limited amount of
time. See id. "Immigrants" include those aliens who will reside in this country.
See id. Both must obtain the proper type of visa. See id.
See H.R. REP. No. 91-851 (1970) reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 275037.
51 [hereinafter House Report].
38.
The other non-immigrant visas relevant to international business
include: the Business (B-1) and Tourist (B-2); the Treaty Insider (E-l) and Treaty
Investor (E-2); Temporary Worker (H); Business Visitor/Temporary Worker (B1 [H]); and Intracompany Transferee (L). See Wangerin, supranote 36, at 850-56.
See House Report, supranote 37, at 2752.
39.
See it. at 2751.
40.
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foreign national could not "temporarily" occupy a permanent
position such as Chief Executive Officer or Vice President. These
restrictions limited the ability of the TNC to fill vacant positions
41
with available employees.
The second option, the J visa, is not a viable alternative for a
TNC. 4 2 The J visa is designed to bring "exchange visitors" to the
United States. 4 3 Once in this country, however, the alien is
prohibited from adjusting his status to permanent resident. 4 4
The foreign national is also required to leave the country for at
4S
least two years prior to applying for an immigrant visa.
Although most TNC employees come to the United States on a
temporary assignment, the company needs the option of changing
their status to permanent residency if necessary.46
Because neither the H visa nor the J visa adequately
addressed the needs of the multinational corporation, prior to the
creation of the L visa, the employee was most often forced to apply
for an immigrant visa and qualify for permanent residence. 47 As
a result of this practice, the demand for immigrant visas was
extraordinarily high and precluded otherwise qualified non48
business personnel from obtaining lawful permanent residence.
Moreover, the process was extremely slow and forced
49
multinational corporations to walt a year or more for the visa.
This delay severely restricted normal business operations.

41.
See id. The H visa has been cited as the most complex business nonimmigrant visa as it requires the company to deal with both the INS and the
Department of Labor. See Susan Gaylord Willis, The Ins and Outs of Immigration,
HR MAOAZINE, Oct. 7, 1996, at 139, available in 1996 WI 9969590. The company
must first file the initial application with the INS and then complete a
cumbersome "Labor Condition Application" from the Department of Labor stating
that there is no strike or lockout in progress and that the employment of the
foreign national will not adversely affect U.S. workers. See id. Also, unlike most
non-immigrant visas, the H visa has an annual numerical limit. See ic. These
limitations make it a difficult choice for the TNC. See id.
42.
See House Report, supranote 37, at 2751.

43.
44.
45.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Willis, supranote 41, at 139.
See House Report, supranote 37, at 2754. Under the quota system, a

46.
47.
total of 270,000 immigrant visas may be issued each year. Furthermore, no more
than 20,000 immigrant visas may be issued to persons from any one country in a

single year. See Barry R. Chiswick, Guidelinesfor the Reform of ImmigrationPolicy,
36 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 893, 899 (1982).
48.
See House Report, supranote 37, at 2754.

49.
Some of the most vocal opponents to the pre-1970 business
immigration system were Canadian business owners who felt that the long delays
severely impacted their ability to do business within the United States. See id
(noting that qualified visa applicants from Canada must wait approximately a year
for a visa).
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III. CONGRESS CREATED THE L VISA AS A SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF BUSINESS IMMIGRATION
In 1970, Congress approved a new type of visa to address the
needs of multinational corporations. The design of the L visa
included several provisions favorable to international business: a
rapid approval process, the ability to petition for permanent
residence while in the United States without satisfying the Labor
Certification Process, and a streamlined procedure for companies
transferring large numbers of employees to the United States on a
frequent basis. 50 These flexible provisions, however, also made
the L visa vulnerable to fraud.
A. Legislative Policy Behind the L Visa
In 1970, Congress assessed the immigration system and
concluded that the existing program "restricts and inhibits the
ability of international companies to bring into the United States
foreign nationals with management, professional, and specialist
skills and thereby enable American business to maintain and
improve the management effectiveness of international companies
sl
to expand U.S. exports to be competitive in overseas markets."
Furthermore, Congress stated that such interchange was critical

to the development of a global economy as it permitted an
individual to advance in an international company without regard
to nationality and allowed the development of superior
52
management skfils
Congress took special note that the United States was behind
most other countries in this respect as "generally U.S.
corporations experience no difficulty in transferring personnel
from the United States to other countries."5 3
These intracompany transfers had contributed "immeasurably to the growth
of American enterprise throughout the world and to the
international trade of the United States."54

50.
51.
52.

See id
Id. at 2751.
See id. at 2752.

53.
Id. (emphasis added). This was, however, not universally the case. In
a letter addressed to the House, James T. Lynn, General Counsel for the
Department of Commerce noted that the United States was not the only country
with excessively long waits for business immigrants. In a survey of 81 U.S.-based
companies by the National Foreign Trade Counsel, excessively long waits were
present in other countries. See id at 2760.
54.
Id. at 2571.
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For these reasons, in 1970, Congress amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act and created a new category of
visas for intracompany transferees. The L visa was designed to
meet the needs of a small, specialized group of multinational
businesses needing a quick process to circumvent the usual
bureaucratic maze required for non-immigrant visas.5s
This new visa had several distinct advantages for the U.S.
company desiring to transfer a foreign employee to the home
office or an international company wishing to establish a branch

office in the United States.

Most notably, in drafting this

legislation, Congress intentionally crafted malleable requirements
for the L visa to allow international businesses maximum
flexibility. Although the intent of Congress was to address the
legitimate needs of the international business community,
Congress unknowingly created an incentive for criminal
organizations to misuse the provisions as a method for illegal
immigration.
B. The L Visa's BifurcatedApproval Process
Three federal agencies administer the immigration process.
The Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) oversees immigration laws for aliens arriving in the
United States and those already present in the country.5 6 The
State Department, through the consulates, administers these
laws for aliens who are seeking to enter the United States and are
presently located in a foreign country.5 7 And for most visas, the
Department of Labor also must certify that the proposed alien will
5 8
not adversely affect U.S. workers or working conditions.
1. INS Approval Process
If a TNC currently has a base of operations in the United
States and wishes to obtain an L visa for an employee, the
employer will first petition the INS. 5 9 The employer must file the
petition with the INS center in the jurisdiction where the

55.
Unlike the H visa, the L visa applicant was deemed "pre-certified." The
Department of Labor Certification Process and job posting requirements were
removed. See David M. Morris, The Hot S" Visa: Is it Right for You?, IMMIGR.
ADVISOR, Nov. 1996, at 5, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
56.
See 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1998). There is a limited right of appeal in federal
court for some applicants rejected by the INS. See Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 576, 701-03 (1994).

57.

See 20 C.F.R. § 656.2 (c)(1) (1998).

58.
See 22 C.F.R. 656.2 (c.) (1) (1998).
candidates. See Willis supranote 41, at 139.
59.

This is not necessary for L visa

See ROBERT C. DIVINE, IMMIGRATION PRACTIcE 483 (1994).

1999]

L VISA FRAUD

employee will be located. 60 If the petition is granted, the INS will
issue form 1-797 to the consulate in the employee's country of
origin or current residence. The actual visa will be issued by the
61
consulate officer.
One of the most beneficial provisions of the L visa is the
expedited approval process. Under normal conditions, the INS
must approve or deny a visa petition within thirty days of the
application. 6 2 In limited circumstances, if an established company
files the petition, the INS may issue a decision within seventy-two
hours.63
From the beginning, Congress was worried that the L visa
might be misused by unscrupulous individuals who would
manipulate the loose provisions in an effort to elude the strict
immigration process.6 4 For example, a person might come into

the United States under the guise of a "temporary" transfer but
intend to stay in the country permanently. 65 Furthermore, an L
visa transferee is allowed to bring immediate family members to
the United States 6 6 and does not have to maintain a personal

residence abroad; therefore, the employee may have little
incentive to return to his home country after the visa expired. 67

60.

See id.

61.

See Business Law Inc., Editorial Staff, Corporate Counsel's Guide to

Business Related Visas in TRANSNATIONAL JOINT VENTuRES 7.034 (William A.
Hancock ed., 1994) [hereinafter Corporate Counsel's Guide to Business Related

Visas].
62.
Although this is accepted procedure, there is no penalty to the INS if
the agency takes longer to process the application. See id. Non-immigrant
business visas typically take two weeks to two months to have the petition
approved. See id. at 7.003.
63.
See AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 4-6
(Supp. 1995). This is a new procedure established by the Vermont Service
Center. Applications are screened to identify "readily approvable cases .. . by
established corporations." If no complex issues are present in the case, approval
may be complete within 72 hours. See id.
64.
See Steven E. Perlman, Note, Intracompany Transferee Visas-The
Labyrinth to Mobility for InternationalExecutives, 19 N.Y.U. J. INTIL L. & POL. 679,
683 (1987). Those individuals who initially declare their intent to immigrate to
the United States permanently must wait years for a decision on their petition.
However, an executive could avoid this delay by entering the United States first
with an L visa and then applying for residency while living and working in this
country. See id.
65.
There is no statutory requirement that the foreign company remain in
operation while the employee is in the United States. See Perlman, supranote 64
at 680.
66
The L-2 visa allows immediate family members, including the spouse
and unmarried children, to accompany the employee to the United States. See
CorporateCounsel's Guide to Business Related Visas, supranote 61, at 7.029.

67.

See House Report, supranote 37, at 2758.
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To address these concerns, Congress created strict requirements
for L visa eligibility.
a. Requirements for the L Visa
First, not all businesses can qualify for the visa; the L visa
requires a particular business relationship involving a U.S.
business-sponsor and a foreign employee. 68 The two businesses
are required to have the same employer/branch office,
parent/subsidiary or affiliate relationship. 69 One entity, business
or foreign, has to maintain at least fifty-one percent control of the
decisions and management of the other.70 Mere contractual
relationship, even if it involves an exclusive contract, is
71
insufficient to satisfy the requirement.
A foreign business may, however, use the L visa to
legitimately bring employees to the United States for the purpose
of establishing a branch office. 7 2 In this instance, the corporation
would be asked only that the foreign office be a specific size or be

involved with international trade to some degree. 74
To satisfy the second requirement, the transferee must be a
manager, executive, or a specialized knowledge worker. 75 To
determine whether the employee occupies a qualifying position,

68.
See8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(L) (1998).
69.
See DIVINE, supra note 59, at 489. Sole proprietorship, partnerships,
and even non-profit organizations may qualify for L visa status. See Perlman,
supranote 64, at 687-88. The key indicator is a high level of control exercised by
one firm over the other or by a third party over the two firms. See id. at 688. The
alien, however, must be an employee of the organization. See id. at 686-87. This
means that a sole proprietorship cannot use the L visa to transfer the owner to
the United States. However, if the alien is a partial owner of the corporation, he
still may qualify for L status. See id. at 687. In one case, an alien owned onethird of the parent corporation. See ARNOLD H. LEIBowiTZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
REFUGEE POLICY 7-57 (1983) (citing Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd., 17 I &
N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980)). The issue in the case was whether the beneficiary
could be classified as an intra-company transferee. See id. The court
differentiated the terms "employee" from 'employed." See id Although as a partial
owner, the alien was not an "employee" of the corporation, the alien was still
"employed" by the corporation because he was paid a salary for his work.
Therefore, he could be classified as an intra-company transferee. See id.
70.
That does not, however, mean that one business had to maintain 51%
equity ownership over the other. In one case, one firm ("A") with a 10% equity
control of another firm ("B") was deemed a qualifying organization because firm A
maintained effective control over the decisions of firm B. See Perlman, supra note
62, at 688 (citing In re Hughes, 18 1 & N Dec. 289 (Comm'r 1982)).
71.
See ARTHUR M. GELLMAN ET AL., UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION FOR
BUSINESS, INVESTORS AND WORKERS 6 (1981).

72.
73.
74.
75.

See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(I)(1)(ii)(A) (1998).
See Perlman, supranote 64, at 689.
See id
See 8 C.F.R. 204.56)(e)(i.)(A) (1998).
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the INS will analyze both the duties of the employee and the
circumstances of employment.76 Managerial employees are those
who primarily direct an organization, department, or subdivision
of an organization. 77
These employees also supervise other
workers, including the hiring and firing of personnel. 78 Executive
employees primarily direct an organization, establish the policies
and goals of a company, and exercise a significant amount of
independent judgment. 7 9 An employee with specialized knowledge
will have a distinct degree of understanding of the product or
service of a company that is essential to the maintenance of the
80
organization.
The L visa also requires the employee to have worked
continuously for the foreign organization for at least one of the
three years immediately preceding the application.8 1 Although
not stated specifically in the statute, the INS has required the one
year employment to be in a managerial or executive capacity
abroad.8 2 However, the INS has not required the employee to
complete this one year of employment while the qualifying
relationship exists between the two companies.8 3 An employee

76.
To determine whether the employee occupies a qualifying position, the
INS will consider: salary, employment history, education, current job description,
number of employees, and volume of business. See Perlman, supra note 64, at
693.
77.
See DMNE, supranote 59, at 493.
78.
See id

79.

See id.

80.

See id. at 494. The "specialized knowledge," however, must either

relate to commerce or it must allow American companies to compete overseas. In
Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., the tire company wanted to use an L visa to transfer
a native French educator to the United States. See LEIBOWITz, supranote 69, at
7-62 (citing Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I & N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978)).
The company argued that the teacher possessed "specialized knowledge" of the
French Education System and would educate the children of the French
employees so those pupils would not fall behind in their studies while their
parents were temporarily assigned to the United States. kL The court found that
while the teacher possessed specialized knowledge of the French education
system, such knowledge did not fall within the language of the statute as it did
not concern commerce or the movement of key personnel within the organization.

Id.
81.
See 8 CFR § 204.5(j)(3)(A) (1998).
82.
See DIVINE, supra note 59, at 494. Although the employee must have
"continuously worked" for the foreign employer for one year prior to applying for
the visa, the "continuity" is not disrupted if the employee briefly travels to the
United States for business or pleasure. However, the time spent in the United
States will not be counted towards the one year requirement. See icL at 495.
83.
See id. The nature of the relationship between the two companies
could also change while the alien is working for the foreign corporation (i.e., an
employer with a foreign branch office may become a parent company with a
foreign subsidiary). See id. at 490 n.90.
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may qualify for an L visa after completing one year of employment
with a foreign business that only recently affiliated with a U.S.
84
company.
Finally, an employer must submit documentation that its
employee will depart the United States at the conclusion of the
authorized stay.8 5 However, a unique and valuable provision of
the L visa is that it allows the applicant to alter his status while
in the U.S. and apply for permanent residence simultaneously.
After one year, an employee may file directly with the INS for
the cumbersome
lawful permanent residence, effectively avoiding
3 6
Department of Labor certification process.
b. Terms of the L Visa
The initial visa is granted for either one or three years. 8 7 The
employee may be granted a three year visa if the U.S. company
has been in business for at least one year.8 8 If the company is
new, however, defined as having been in existence for less than
twelve months, only a one year visa will be issued.8 9 Extensions
are allowed up to a total of seven years (managers and executives)
or five years (employees having specialized knowledge).9 0 Once the
limit is reached the employee must leave the United States and
91
may not petition for an L or an H visa for one year.
c. Blanket Visa Petitions
An employer may either complete an individual application
for each potential transferee or petition for a blanket visa.9 The
blanket visa, one of the most favorable provisions of the L visa,
allows large corporations that frequently transfer groups of

84.
85.
86.

See id at 495.
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(7)(i)(A)(2) (1998).
See Morris, supra note 55, at 5.

87.

See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(I)(7)(i)(A)(2), (3) (1998).

See i.
88.
89.
See id; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(F) (1998).
90.
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(I)(15)(ii). Aliens whose U.S. employment is
seasonal or intermittent, defined as less than six months a year, are exempt from
See
the five/seven year limitation and may apply for indefinite extensions.
DMNE, supranote 59, at 484.
91.
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2a)(12)(14 (1998). Under the North American Free
Trade Act, Canadians are exempt from this process. See DIVINE, supra note 59, at
484. Canadian citizens may receive an extension of their L visa by simply
presenting a petition to an immigration officer at a Class A port of entry, a U.S.
airport handling international traffic or U.S. pre-clearance/pre-flight station. See
it .

92.

See 8 C.F.R. § 214.20l)(4I.
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employees to submit one application. 93 If approved, the company
and its branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates are deemed
When the company transfers an
qualifying organizations. 94
individual employee to the United States, that alien need only
apply to the consulate in his home country. 95 The company is
not required to submit additional documentation to the INS.
To receive the favorable blanket visa status, the multinational
corporation must prove the following: (1) the petitioner and each
of the other offices are involved in commercial trade or services;
(2) the United States office has been in business for one year or
more; (3) the company has three or more domestic or foreign
branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates; (4) and approval of at least
ten L applications during the previous twelve months or United
States subsidiaries with combined annual sales of twenty-five
million or more or a U.S. workforce of at least one thousand
employees. 9 6 A blanket petition may be extended indefinitely after
97
the first three-year issuance.
2. The State Department Approval Process
If the INS approves the petition for either the single or
blanket L visa, that agency notifies the State Department. The
State Department is responsible for issuing the actual visa to the
candidate. 98 Uniquely, the persons from the State Department

who issue the L visa are U.S. consuls, most of whom lack any
formal training in immigration law.9 9

In contrast to the INS,

93.
See Corporate Counsel's Guide to Business Related Visas, supra note
61, at 7.033.
94.
See DIVINE, supranote 59, at 498.
95.
See id. at 499.
See Corporate Counsel's Guide to Business Related Visas, supra note
96.

61, at 7.032. If a conglomerate files a blanket L visa petition, the INS may
approve some, all, or none of the entities for blanket visa status. See DMVINE,
supranote 59, at 499.
97.
See DIVINE, supra note 59, at 499. Three years after the blanket
petition is approved, the petitioner may request an indefinite extension. A new
petition must be filed with the INS containing: a copy of the approved blanket
visa petition, a report of all employees transferred to the United States under the
blanket visa (including dates of arrival and departure and a list of the positions
occupied by the foreign employees), a statement of continuing eligibility for the L
visa, and any new additions/dropped entities. See id.
98.
See Robert G. Heiserman, ConsularProcessing: Just Vzsiting-ReallyIrrelevant Relevances, in PROCESS AND PROCEDURES:

A GUIDE TO VISA PROCESS AT

U.S. CONSULS AND EMBASSIEs 20, 20-23 (Charles M. Miller et al. eds. 1992)
[hereinafter PROcESS AND PROCEDURES].

99.
See Jose E. Latour, Consular Processing of Visas: Other Side of the
Window, in PROCESS AND PROCEDURES, supranote 98, at 24, 26; see also Perlman,
supranote 64, at 681 & n.15.

252

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 32:237

which examines a paper record to assess whether to approve the
petition, the consul officer determines the legitimacy of the
application by speaking first-hand to the applicant.1 0 0 In the
traditional immigration process, the consulate has the power to
approve or deny a petition solely based on the individual officer's
subjective determination as to whether the candidate is telling the
10 1
truth.
Under normal procedure, the consulate officers are often illequipped to differentiate between fraudulent applications and
legitimate ones. Visa duty is a disfavored part of a consulate
officer's job and is normally assigned to the newest officers.1l 2
These officers may lack the sophisticated language experience
required to properly assess a visa application. Furthermore,
consulate officers may be unfamiliar with the nuances of the visa
application process as most are foreign service officials, rather
than attorneys, and receive the majority of their training through
03
on-the-job experience.'
This situation is compounded, however, when the consulate
officer must decide whether to approve or deny an L visa
application. Ordinarily, the alien has the burden of convincing
the consulate officer that the requirements for the visa are met.'°4
In contrast, if the INS approves an L visa petition, the consular
officer must issue the visa unless it can show additional
information that was not presented to the INS that would
105
preclude the alien from qualifying for the visa.
Because of the lack of training and supervision for consulate
officers and the inherent subjectivity in the visa application
process, it is highly likely that mistakes are made. The decision
of the consulate, however, is not subject to review, even if the
officer acted under erroneous or biased assumptions. Absent a
0
gross abuse of discretion, the consulate's decision is final. 1 6

100.

See Heiserman, supra note 98, at 21-23.

101. Seeic-at20-21,
102. Latour, supra note 98, at 26. Moreover, as the number of visa
applications increase, the ability for a new consulate officer to make an accurate

judgment decreases dramatically. Not surprisingly, most consulate officers apply
for a transfer to a new position within the embassy as soon as one opens up. See
i
103.
104
105.

See id at 25-27.
See id at 28.
See Willis, supranote 41, at 139.

106. See Latour, supra note 98, at 27-28. The State Department concedes
that the consul's decision is subjective. Nevertheless, there is no administrative
review of the consul's decision. See id at 28. Courts have repeatedly held that
aliens have no legal right to immigration. Therefore, there is no legal right to a
review of the consul's decision. See Centeno v. Schultz, 817 F.2d 1212, 1213 (5th
Cir. 1987).
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It seems unlikely that the present consulate review process
would effectively guard against L visa fraud.
Normally, the
interview would provide the opportunity for the consulate officer
to review the petition and make a subjective determination as to
whether the person is an appropriate candidate for the visa.
However, if the L visa candidate is presumptively entitled to the
visa before anyone has ever seen or spoken with the foreign
national, it seems as if the interview would not serve the same
purpose. If the employer submits a sufficient paper record to the
INS, why would the consulate officer have an incentive to actively
investigate the application? Absent some obvious evidence of a
fraudulent visa application, it seems likely that the employee
would receive an L visa without incident.
When Congress created the L visa, it developed an
immigration tool with significant advantages for the TNC. First,
the L visa, with its accelerated processing feature allows a
company to respond in a timely manner to changes in personnel
or market demands.1 0 7 Second, should an employer want to
permanently transfer the employee to the United States, the
employee could file with the INS for lawful permanent residence
status after entering the country.' 0 8
Finally, the blanket
provision allows a company to transfer large numbers of
personnel without applying for each visa individually.10 9 These
three advantages, however, may also account for the high number
of fraudulent visas granted every year.

IV. MISUSE OF THE L VISA BY CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
AS A METHOD FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

When the L visa was created, Congress was primarily
concerned with preventing foreign employees from using the visa
to enter the country on a temporary basis but with the intention
of applying for permanent residence status.' 10 When the House

Judicial Committee examined this issue, it concluded that the
potential for fraudulent activity was minimal because "no
international company would jeopardize or endanger its future
need for a corporate executive rotation by attempting to misuse or
abuse such procedure as a vehicle for immigration." 1 1 ' While
legitimate international businesses may have every incentive to

107.

See supraPart HI.A.

108.
109.
110.
111.

See supranotes 85-86 and accompanying text.
See supraPart M.B.
See House Report, supranote 37, at 2755.
Id.
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comply with immigration regulations, Congress failed to consider
the possibility that a criminal organization could manipulate this
visa as a powerful tool for illegal immigration.
A. The Emerging GlobalMafia

Global organized crime is the world's fastest growing industry
with yearly profits estimated at over $1 trillion. 1 12 Just as the
post-World War II economy has lead to an increase in the
globalization of legitimate businesses, the same forces have
contributed to the proliferation of international criminal
conspiracies. 113 Transnational crime presents the "greatest long
term threat to the security of the United States" and poses a risk
to democratic societies throughout the world. 114
Traditionally, organized crime was centered in only one
country. Although organized criminal syndicates in the United
States often recruited new members from recent immigrant
populations, few alliances were formed with groups from other
countries.1 15
The new transnational criminal organizations,
however, coordinate activities between countries. Members of
Russian Organized Crime units who steal automobiles from the
United States may ship the parts to Russian associates in
Germany or Russia. 116 And Chinese gangs involved in alien
smuggling operations establish branch operations in China, Hong

Kong, and the United States. 117

112. Transnational criminal organizations are involved in crimes from
money laundering and currency counterfeiting to trafficking in drugs and nuclear
materials. See Executive Summary to GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME: THE NEW EMPIRE
OF EVIL at ix (Linnea P. Raine & Frank J. Cilluffo eds., 1994) [hereinafter GLOBAL
ORGANIZED CRIME].
113. See id. at xi. International Organized Crime has been called "the new
communism, the new monolithic threat" Michael Elliot, Global Mafia, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 13, 1993, at 22.
114. Executive Summary, supranote 112, atix.
115. Probably the best example is the Italian Mafia. The organization began
in Sicily where private landowners hired armies to protect their lands against
peasant uprisings. See WILLIAM KLEIN KNECHT, THE NEW ETHNIC MOBS 37 (1996).
Italian peasants who emigrated to the United States during the early twentieth
century were often surprised to find their old oppressors had also found a home
in the New World. See id Although the American Mafia adopted several
traditions of their Sicilian ancestors, few formal ties were established between the
countries. See id.
116. See id at 304. Russian mobsters also have established formal
alliances with the Colombian cartels to distribute cocaine in the United States.

See id
117. See id. The Chinese tongs, or gangs, have established a highly
successful credit card scheme between Hong Kong and Los Angeles or San
Francisco. See id. A gang member in Hong Kong will transcribe a set of credit
card numbers and forward the information to associate gang members in the
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B. The L Visa is a Powerful Tool for TransnationalCrime
Members of legitimate TNCs use the L visa to move personnel
within the organization.' s Transnational criminal organizations
use the L visa to facilitate either the expansion of criminal
activities in the United States or as a lucrative method to smuggle

illegal immigrants into the country.1 1 9

Because the L visa requires a complex application process, an
individual alien is unlikely to select this method for illegal
immigration.
That type of alien is far more likely to use a
manufactured visa, passport, or residency document in an
attempt to illegally enter the United States. 120 With this type of
illegal immigration, however, the alien continuously risks the
possibility that someone will request identification and discover
the counterfeit documents. 121
In contrast, transnational criminal organizations have the
resources to navigate through the L visa process and effectively
thwart such risk of continuous discovery. With this method, the
criminal organization may use fraudulent documents in an effort

to qualify the alien for an L visa. 12 2 If successful, however, the
illegal immigrant need not rely on manufactured documents once
12 3
in the United States. Instead, the alien receives a valid visa.

United States. See id. Within a few days, a counterfeit credit card with the same
numbers will be in the hands of the gang members in Los Angeles or San

Francisco. See id.
118.
See infraPart Hand Part Il.
119.
See Visa Fraud and Immigration Benefits Application Fraud Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Judiciary Comm.,
105th Cong. 10-11, 13 (1997) (statement of Paul Virtue, Acting Executive
Associate Commissioner, Office of Programs, Immigration and Naturalization
Service) [hereinafter Virtue Testimony].
120.
This is known as document fraud. Document fraud is defined as "the
counterfeiting, sale and/or use of identity documents or breeder documents such
as birth certificates and Social Security cards, alien registration documents and
stamps, passports and visas, and other fraudulent documents and paperwork to
circumvent the immigration laws of the Nation." Id. at 12. The documents are
used to either enter or function within the United States. See id
121.
The alien must "keep a low profile as reliance on fraudulent
documents subjects the alien to continuous risk of discovery. Id.
122.
This is known as benefit application fraud.
The alien willfully
misrepresents a fact in order to qualify for a visa or permanent residency. See id.
The difference is the timing of the fraud. With document fraud, the alien needs to
continuously use the false documents to remain in the country. See id. However,
when the alien commits benefit application fraud, the false statements are made
priorto entry in order to obtain the visa. See id.
123.
Probably the most notorious case of benefit application fraud involved
Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakastani terrorist who allegedly fatally shot two CIA agents
outside the CIA Headquarters in 1993. See id. at 13. Mir Aimal Kansi had
manipulated the INS application process and fraudulently obtained two visas:
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Because the INS destroys supporting visa documents after only
one year, it is unlikely that the fraudulent documents will ever be
discovered.124
The flexible provisions of the L visa provide ample
opportunity for such fraud. The visa must be approved within
thirty days, leaving little time for the INS investigator to examine
an application. Furthermore, the visa is granted largely on the
basis of a paper record.
If the criminal organization can
manufacture fraudulent documents able to pass a cursory
inspection with the INS, the individual alieri will have little trouble
obtaining the visa from the consulate.
The prototypical L visa scheme involves
a shell

corporation.1 25

The transnational criminal organization will

manufacture the necessary documents and petition for an L visa.
Once approval is granted the organization will either use the visa
to "transfer" foreign operatives to the United States or sell the
"positions" in the corporation to aliens needing a nearly foolproof
126
method of illegal immigration.
Once in this country, the illegal immigrant may apply for an

extension without an additional interview and may never be
required to submit additional documentation verifying legitimate
business purposes.
And after the required one year, the
transferee may apply for permanent residence in the United
States. 127
During a series of hearings on visa fraud held in May 1997
before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, INS and
State Departments officials testified that the two multinational
organized crime groups most proficient in L visa fraud were
128
Russian Organized Crime units and Chinese syndicates.
1. L Visa Fraud and Russian Organized Crime
The first group to effectively use the L visa as a means for
illegal immigration were units of the Russian Organized Crime

one was a non-immigrant business visa and the other was obtained through the
amnesty program. See Branigin, supranote 8, at A4.
124. See Easy In, Easy Stay, L.A. TIMEs. March 9, 1993, at B6.
125. See Virtue Testimony, supran6te 119, at 10.
126. See Hearings on Combatting Illegal ImmigrationBefore the Subcomm. on
Immigration & Claims, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WI 10570044
(testimony of George Regan, Acting Associate Commissioner, Enforcement,
Immigration and Naturalization Service) [hereinafter Regan Testimony].
127. See Part II for information about the ease of applying for permanent
residence from an L visa.
128. See Smith Opening Statement, supranote 10, at 2.
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(ROC).12 9 The ROC has been most successful with sophisticated

white collar crimes such as medical insurance or fuel tax
fraud. 130 The L visa, with its largely paper application process,
allows the ROC to transfer the same skills to immigration
fraud. 131
As early as 1994, government officials encountered a sharp
increase in the number of L visa applications filed by Russian
companies.
Immigration officials reported that although the
initial applications were poorly prepared and resulted in quick
denials, later fraudulent petitions were much improved and more
difficult to detect. 132 After a 1996 investigation, INS agents on
the East Coast identified over two hundred Russian shell
corporations that had been used in L visa schemes. 133
Experience in the Former Soviet Union also provided ample
training for L visa fraud. Soviet citizens were forced to navigate
through a communist bureaucracy that demanded papers to
1
work, travel, buy certain goods, get medical care, or buy a car. 3
Any successful criminal quickly learned to master the art of
35
forgery.1
With that background, it is not surprising that the ROC is
able to manipulate effectively the largely paper L visa application

129. The Russian Mafia was identified as the perpetrator of these schemes
after a large inter-departmental investigation involving the Department of State,
the FBI, and the INS Organized Crime Task Force.
See Visa Fraud and
Immigration Benefits Application Fraud Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims, 105th Cong. 22 (1997) (testimony of William Yates,

Director of the Vermont Service Center) [hereinafter Yates Testimony].
130. The most profitable of these schemes involved a chain of phony fuel
wholesalers. Federal law requires that fuel wholesalers collect the tax from their
sales and turn it over the IRS. See KLEIN KNECHT, supra note 115, at 273. The

Russian Mob would create a series of shell corporations and then arrange for
their own fuel wholesalers to "sell the fuel to the phony corporations but "forget"
to collect the tax. See id. When the IRS tried to collect the tax, the agency would
discover that the company no longer existed. See id. The New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance estimated that the Russian Mob collected
around $1 million a week from this scheme. See id.at 274. In fact, the scam was
so profitable that when John Gotti heard of the idea he demanded a partnership
with the Russians. See id. at 273.
131. In 1991 there were an estimated 780 gangs in the Former Soviet
Union, in 1994 that number had increased to 5,700 with over 3 million
associates. The Russian gangs have relations with 29 foreign countries and run
more than 200 gangs in the United States. See Claire Sterling, Containing the
New CriminalNomenklatura, in GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME: THE NEW EMPIRE OF EVIL,
supra note 112, at 106, 106.
132.
See Yates Testimony, supra note 129, at 22.
133.
See Branigin, supranote 8, at A4.
134.
See KLEIN KNECHT,supranote 115, at 272.
135.
See id.
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process. 136 However, even if the INS made a concerted effort to
detect ROC operatives applying for L visas, the effort would be
largely unsuccessful.1 3 7 For humanitarian reasons, the United
States has elected to waive an examination of criminal records for
persons applying for visas from the former Soviet Union. Because

so many potential applicants had been imprisoned for political
reasons, the United States decided that it would be impossible to
differentiate effectively between real criminals and former political

prisoners. 138
If the illegal alien is not a member of the ROC, but instead
purchases his "position" in the company, the foreign national
pays for part of his passage with cash and part with service to the
organization once in the United States.13 9 Men become low-level
extortionists or drug couriers while women are forced into

prostitution. 140 The organization also holds their papers until the
alien accumulates enough merchandise to repay the debt. 141
2. L Visa Fraud and the Chinese Mafia
The Russian Mob is not the only group exploiting the
provisions of the L visa for illegal immigration. INS officials also
report that this visa is rapidly becoming the favored method for
organized smuggling from China to the United States. 142 When
State Department officials investigated this problem in two
Chinese provinces, they found that between eighty to ninety
percent of all the L visa applications were wholly fraudulent. 14

136.

The Russian organized criminal groups control 40,000 businesses,

including 2,000 state enterprises, 4,000 organizations, 9,000 cooperatives, 7,000
small enterprises, 407 banks, and 697 markets. See Sterling, supra note 131, at

114.
137. See Regan Testimony, supra note 126. Criminal operatives from
Russia rarely apply for a visa under their own names. See idt Instead these
criminals will use a high quality counterfeit passport, easily available from a
travel agency or document facilitator for $120-200. See id.
138. See Jerry Seper, The Soviet Mafiw An American Success Story, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at Al. Similarly, in fifty countries (including Mexico,
Pakistan, Afghanistan,

Iraq

and Iran) the State

Department waives

the

requirement that visa applicants provide a copy of their police report as evidence
of their lack of criminal history as the police departments are ridden with
corruption. See Smith Opening Statement, supranote 10, at 3. The result is that
aliens with vast criminal records are given visas to the United States. See idL
139. See Regan Testimony, supra note 126.
140.
141
142.

See id.
See id.
See id.

143. In the Hainan Province over ninety percent of the visa applications
were found to be completely fraudulent. Furthermore, the consulate in Shanghai
has a "burgeoning problem with L visa fraud but is without the resources to
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During the late 1980s, Chinese organized crime groups based
in China and Hong Kong joined forces and turned the human
smuggling trade into an enormously profitable venture. 144 Before
this time, Chinese gangs had concentrated on smuggling heroin
from the Far East into the United States. 14
The Chinese
syndicates realized, however, that alien smuggling could be an
equally profitable venture with far less risk. The penalty for alien
smuggling is only a few months in jail, while a conviction for drug
smuggling may carry a penalty of up to twenty-five years to life in
prison. 146
The syndicates began by smuggling huge numbers of aliens
into the United States on crowded fishing boats.' 4 7 As the United
States increased its border controls, however, the syndicates
needed an alternative route for the transaction.14 The L visa
provided such a method. With an L visa, an alien did not have to
sneak into the United States; the illegal immigrant was able to
enter through official channels.
Chinese immigrants will typically pay up to fifty thousand
dollars to a broker who will manufacture the documents needed
to support the L visa application.' 4 9 The broker will contact a
branch of the organization in the United States that will apply for
the visa. Once approved, the alien is able to visit a consulate with
the manufactured documents and receive the visa. Those who
can afford to probably pay the entire fee in cash. However, as
with other forms of alien smuggling, those who cannot afford to

investigate." John R. Emshwiller, Fraud Plagues Foreign Investment Programs,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1996.
144.
The alien smuggling trade is so prevalent, it has been called a modem
day "underground railroad." See Tod Robberson, Corridorof Hope; Asian Migrants

Employing CentralAmerica as UndergroundRailway to U.S., DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 21, 1997, at 18R, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
145. See KLEIN KNEcHT, supranote 115, at 168.
146. See id.
147. Such was the case on June 6, 1993 when the Golden Venture ran
aground off the shores of New York City. See Seth Fiason, Hunt Goes on for
Smugglers in Fatal Trip, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at 27. The boat carried
hundreds of Chinese illegal immigrants who jumped ship to try and swim ashore.
See id. Ten people drowned and hundreds of others were rounded up and put in
jail. See id.
148. Although the INS has devoted an increasing amount of resources to
border enforcement, number of aliens using fraudulent means to enter and
remain in the U.S. has also increased. See Virtue Testimony, supranote 119, at
11-12.
149.
See Branigin, supranote 8, at A4.
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pay may be forced to work in slave-like conditions while slowly
paying off the debt. 15o
In 1996, after discovering the high percentage of fraudulent L
visa applications from China, the INS decided to randomly visit a
number of the Chinese companies approved for the L visa.
During this investigation, INS agents found that numerous
companies had listed either nonexistent addresses or were "fleabag motels, mail drops, apartments, the offices of immigration
'consultants,' or unrelated Chinese businesses that are used as
fronts." 15 1 In one case a man granted an L-1 visa and listed as a
corporate officer was found at the listed address sitting in a barn,
wearing dirty old clothes and sorting vegetables. The company
was only one of -four using that address. 152
In another
investigation, a two bedroom apartment served as the home
address for twenty Chinese "companies" that had applied for

visas. 153
The INS rarely conducts these random checks on companies
approved for the L visa. Even if the agency suspects any type of L
visa fraud, it is without the manpower and resources to
investigate the problem. 15 4 The agency employs only one
thousand six hundred agents for interior enforcement of the
entire country; less than half the number of police officers
assigned to the Washington DC metropolitan police force. Due to
the small number of officers and its large caseload, the INS
confessed that less than half of all fraud cases reported in 1996
were ever investigated. 155

150. See Robberson, supra note 144. Traditionally, Chinese smugglers, or
"snakeheads," are especially ruthless in demanding payments. Some Chinese
illegal immigrants are kidnapped or brutally assaulted. While in China, the
snakehead may entice the alien with promises of a good paying job once in the

United States. In reality, many illegal aliens, smuggled into the United States, do
not speak the language and are unable to find work. And, once the alien arrives
in the United States, the snakehead may demand immediate payment of the
entire balance. See Kevin Tessier, Immigration Project: The New Slave Trade: The
InternationalCrisis of Immigrant Smuggling, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 261, 261

(1995).
151.

Branigin, supranote 8,atA4.

152.

See id.

153.
154.

See Emshwiller, supranote 143, at B1.
See Branigin, supranote 8, at A4.

155.

See id.
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The INS has stated repeatedly that the immigration system
must have simple and effective rules and regulations.1 5 6 Both
immigrants and non-immigrants who want to comply with the
rules should find the system "user-friendly."1 5 7 And those who
seek to violate the rules "should face a high degree of certainty
that they will be caught." 5 8 However, even the INS admits that
"there are elements of the nonimmigrant system currently
faltering on the edges of credibility."' 5 9 The L visa system is one
such example.
Prior efforts to control the misuse of the L visa have been
aimed primarily at legitimate international businesses.
The
Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, which
contained the first significant changes to the L visa since its
creation in 1970, did not directly address the problem of L visa
fraud. The 1996 legislation, however, did provide the INS with a
new option to crackdown on foreign nationals who committed
160
even minor violations of U.S. immigration law.
The most significant change to business immigration, as a
result of the 1996 law, was the penalty attached to a business
immigrant who overstayed his authorized period of admission.
According to the new law, a non-immigrant's visa is void on the

156. See Nonimmigrant Visa Issues Hearings: Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong. 29 (1995) (statement of Doris Meissner, Commissioner,
Immigration and Naturalization Service) [hereinafter Meissner Testimony].
157. Id.
158. Id. This necessitates "documents that are tough to fake and easy to
detect when altered, and competent and honest officers issuing the documents
who are well informed about the tricks that are being used to try and fool them."
Visa Fraud and Immigration Benefit Application Fraud Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 7 (1977) (statement of Mary A. Ryan, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Consular Affairs) [hereinafter Ryan Testimony].
159. See Meissner Testimony, supra note 156.
160. Prior to the 1996 amendment, business visitors had enjoyed a wide
degree of "tolerance" concerning their visa deadlines. For example, "B-l"
business visitors took advantage of an INS policy that allowed them to stay up to
one week beyond their authorized visa without filing a formal extension request.
The alien simply had to write to the local office with the new departure date.
Attorneys are now warning clients that this practice is dangerous. See Catherine
Henin-Clark, Impact of the New U.S. Immigration Law on Business and
Employment-Related Visas, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INV. REPoRT, Dec. 15, 1996,
availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
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first day of the overstay. 16 1 Furthermore, that individual cannot
apply for an extension while in this country and instead is
required to apply for a new temporary visa from his own country
of residence. 162

If an alien overstays for a total of 180 days or more, he is
1 a
barred from admission to the United States for three years. 6
Aliens who overstay for a year or more are locked out of the
United States for ten years. 164 Moreover, a non-immigrant who
has overstayed his visa is likely to face increased scrutiny when
applying for future visas. These individuals will be flagged as
possible future overstay violators.165
The new overstay penalty does provide an additional incentive
for legitimate employers to make sure their employees maintain
lawful status and depart in a timely manner. This new provision,
however is unlikely to have a significant impact on the problem of
L visa fraud. Because the INS lacks the manpower to investigate
possible immigration fraud schemes, and the agency has no
method to formally monitor the approved departure date for L

visas, the agency will only learn of overstay violations when the
company files for an extension.166
It is unlikely that shell
corporations would file for an extension as the alien often seeks
permanent residency before the L visa expires.
One suggested solution to the problem is to make it more
difficult for multinational companies to qualify for an L visa.
Such proposals include raising the minimum requirements for the
L visa 1 6 7 or levying a significant tax on multinational companies
using the L visa. 16 8 These proposals, however, would likely
161. See id. Several business commentators have stated that this provision
could subject legitimate businesses to extreme penalties if companies have to
withdraw key personnel because of a twenty-four hour oversight. Seeid.
162. See id. Under the old law, the violating employee could go to an
adjacent country, such as Canada, and obtain a new temporary visa. See it.

163. See i. There was, however, a definite need to address the overstay
problem in the United States. Prior to the 1996 law, the INS estimated that
300,000 non-immigrants each year stayed past their scheduled departure date.
See Meissner Testimony, supra note 151, at 29. These illegal immigrants
comprised forty to fifty percent of the entire illegal immigrant population. See i.
164. See Henin-Clark, supra note 160.

165. See id.
166 However, one member of the Russian Organized Crime filed an L visa
extension while in prison. See Yates Testimony, supranote 129, at 24.
167. This solution was proposed by Representatives Lamar Smith of Texas
and Alan Simpson of Wyoming. The ultimate goal was to reduce legal
immigration into the United States by one-third, to 595,000, by 2002. See Charles
Lunan, Legislation Seeks Limits on the Influx of Foreigners,Fr. LAUDERDALE SUNSENTINAL, Nov. 6, 1995, at 7.
168.
Representative Alan Simpson also proposed that a thirty percent

employer fee should be collected off the salary of all foreign workers. Immigration

attorneys responded that idea would be "very negative" and that, "thirty percent
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preclude a number of legitimate but small multinational
16 9
corporations from utilizing the advantages of the L visa.
Because of the increasing importance of TNCs, any solution must
be carefully balanced to minimize the effect on legitimate
businesses. 170
A viable solution to the L visa fraud problem is likely to
include two components. First, the INS and the State Department
need to implement better procedures to detect and deter offenders
without jeopardizing the legitimate needs of transnational
corporations. Such procedures might include a re-allocation of
resources to allow the INS to focus on the areas with the highest
incidences of fraud, and a concerted effort to prosecute not only
the individuals who perpetuate the fraudulent schemes, but also
the criminals who profit from these illegal practices.
Any comprehensive solution to the problem, however, must
also contain an international component. L visa fraud is only a
means used by transnational criminal organizations to expand
operations or facilitate illegal smuggling to the United States.
Without an effective international solution aimed at ending this
type of crime, the criminal organizations will simply shift to
another method to achieve the same ends.
A. Solution # 1: DecreaseL Visa Fraud Through Better
Identification of CriminalApplicants and Increased
Penaltiesfor Individuals Who Participatein These Schemes
The INS and the consulates are overworked and
understaffed. 17 1 In order to effectively detect L visa fraud, these
agencies need better allocation of resources to focus on the areas

containing the most fraudulent applications and better methods
to identify possible fraudulent applications. 17 2

of a CEO's salary-that's quite a hit."

David Thomas, Special Report: Doing

Business in the U.S., FIN. POST, Sept 30, 1995, at 35.
169. As one Miami immigration attorney stated, the proposed bills would
preclude hundreds of South Florida companies from getting L-is. "We are not
dealing with Mercedes-Benz and Motorola here," said Tammy Fox-Isicott, a Miami
immigration lawyer. Lunan, supra note 162, at 7. "We are dealing with mom-andpop firms and small companies ....
Ninety-five percent of these companies
would close." Id.
170. See discussioninfraPart II.
171. The INS staff was expected to issue over six million visas in 1997,
double the number issued just five years ago with the same size staff. See Ryan
Testimony, supranote 158, at 6.
172. The INS and State Department have done a great deal to address the
problem of document fraud. The documents are printed on products kept under
lock and key and contain a number of security features: intaglio printing to give
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As budgets are slashed and the number of applications rise,
consulates become unable to fulfill their role as the first line of
defense against immigration fraud. In the nineties, "nowhere in
U.S. foreign policy have the changes ...
hit us harder than in
transnational issues affecting consular fraud: demographic
movement of unprecedented levels, political instability, . . . [and]
the growth of international organized crime . . . all combine to
place an enormous burden on our consular officers . ... "173
Expansion of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) could alleviate
some of the strain on consulate resources. 1 74
Established in 1986, VWPP allows temporary visitors for
business or pleasure to forego the requirement to obtain a B visa
prior to traveling to the United States. 7 5- This program has freed
up significant resources.17 6 The Visa Waiver Program is only
available to countries that have a both negligible rate of refusal
for the B visa and a negligible visa overstay rate.17 7 In deciding
whether to grant participation in VWPP, the Attorney General
must also examine the country's national security and
immigration fraud enforcement programs.
One proposal advocates lessening the requirements for the
VWPP to allow more countries to participate, thereby freeing
additional resources. 178 A better proposal, however, would be to

the document a texture, ultra-violet inks, watermarks, coded algorithms, and fine
micro-line printing. See Ryan Testimony, supranote 158, at 8.

173.

Id. at 6.

174. Another program promises to decrease the workload on INS agents.
Called the INS Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS), this program

allows frequent business travelers to process their own clearance at the airports

with specially issued "smart cards." The traveler must apply in person at an INS
office and supply biographical data along with hand geometric data. If approved,
the INS will issue the traveler a magnetic-stripe card with a digital photo and
hand identification data. Once at the airport, the traveler inserts the card and
then must place their hand on a magnetic reader. Over 70,000 people from the
United States and twenty other countries have used the INSPASS program. See
Peyman Pejman, INS Will Roll Out Inspection Kiosks at Airports In the Fall, Gov'"
COMPUTER NEWS, Sept. 1, 1997, at 1.

175. In 1996, over 12 million foreign visitors, or about half of all temporary
business visitors and tourists, entered the U.S. under the VWPP. See Hearings
Before the Visa Waiver Pilot Program Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the
House Comm. on the Judiiary, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) (prepared statement of
Chairman Lamar Smith) [hereinafter Smith Prepared Statement]. This program
has the added benefit of encouraging travel and tourism. See icl. at 2.
176.
See ic.
177.
See id
178. This idea has been criticized for four reasons. First, it would replace

an objective standard with a standard based on subjective factors. See id- at 3.
Second, this is inconsistent with efforts to reduce immigration fraud. See id.
Third, it invites nations that do not meet the objective standards to lobby for
inclusion in the Visa waiver program. See id. Fourth, it is inconsistent with the
program's prior concept of a successful program. See i.

L VISA FRAUD

1999]

extend the scope of the program for qualifying countries to
include the L visa. A significant portion of L visa applications are
from international companies incorporated in countries that have
79
already satisfied the rigorous standards for the VWPP.1
Each company would still have to apply to the INS and satisfy
the requirements for the L visa.1 8 0 However, should the INS
approve the petition, the employee would not need to visit the
consulate to receive the L visa. Instead, the employee would be
treated like an individual transferred under the current Blanket L
Visa Program.
The saved resources could be reallocated in an effort to detect
criminal applicants in countries with a high rate of fraudulent
activity. In areas where eighty to ninety percent of the L visa
petitions are from companies that exist only on paper, the
applicant should not be presumptively entitled to the visa.
Instead, as with an application for an immigrant visa, the consul
should carefully scrutinize the petition and have the discretion to
deny the L visa for a reasonable suspicion of fraud. 181
The INS also needs an improved method to identify
corporations that are merely fronts for criminal organizations.
This could involve tracking prior applications to identify patterns
of fraudulent activity and requiring verification of information
submitted on the petition.182
Individual fraudulent paper
applications can easily pass scrutiny.1 83 However, with increased
use of computer analysis, the INS agent could identify when a
number of different companies have used the same

information.18 4

Furthermore, the INS should use Interpol

resources and check the criminal background of employees,
officers, and shareholders in multinational corporations applying
for the L visa. 185

179. Such countries include: The .United Kingdom (14,000 L visa
applications annually), Japan (18,000 L visa applications annually), and Canada
(6,000 L visa applications annually).
See AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, IMMIGRATION
PROCEDURES HANDBOOK at 4-2 (Supp. 1995).

180.
181.

See supranotes 66-84 and accompanying text.
This would result in different treatment for L visa candidates from

countries with high levels of fraudulent L visa application. Such disparate
treatment, however, is not without justification. Protecting the United States from
illegal immigrants is a legitimate priority for the legislature. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the legislative and executive branches
possess plenary power over immigration and, therefore, their decisions are not
subject to judicial review. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977).
182. See Meissner Testimony, supra note 156, at 30-3 1.
183. See Virtue Testimony, supra note 119, at 13.
184. See supranote 153 and accompanying text.
185. Interpol is an international police force with 146 member states. The
purpose of the organization is to gather information about international criminals.
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These procedural alternations could decrease the amount of L
visa fraud without compromising the essential flexibility of the
visa. When fraud is detected, however, both the individuals who
participated in the scheme and the individuals who profited from
186
the scheme should face penalties.
Under the current law, an alien is excludable if he procures a
visa through fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material
fact.187 Misrepresentation can involve either an actual fact that,
if known, would have constituted grounds for denial of the visa,
or a false statement that prevented the INS or consul from
pursuing a relevant line of inquiry into matters affecting the
issuance of the visa.188
This law would allow the INS to deport an alien who has
fraudulently obtained an L visa. However, under current INS
procedure, when the agency prosecutes a criminal organization
for L fraud, there is no strategy to pursue deportation of the
aliens who have benefited from the fraud.18 9 The INS also lacks
the ability to flag the computer records of these aliens so, at a
minimum, they cannot qualify for an extension or permanent
residence. 190

The INS should monitor the aliens entering this country
under the L visa. And, if the company is prosecuted for fraud, the

See Peter J. Vassalo, The New Ivan the Terrible: Problems in CriminalEnforcement
and the Spector of the Russian Mafia, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 173, 185 n.89
(1996) (citing MALCOLM ANDERSON, POLICING THE WORLD: INTERPOL AND THE POLITICS
OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION 3 (1989)). The European communities have
also joined forces to form Europol for the sharing of information about criminal
activity within the European Union. See Vassalo, supra at 186.

186.

This is consistent with newly-altered INS policy that seeks to prosecute

all persons who commit other types of immigration fraud. For example, under
prior INS policy an alien could seek a waiver of deportation for immigration fraud
if the foreign national was a spouse, child, or parent of a United States citizen or
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. See Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251()(1)(A)(i) (1982) (transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227).
However, in INS v. Yang, the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision
which held immigration officials could not consider fraud used to enter the
country as grounds for deportation if the alien was lawfully married to a
permanent resident. 519 U.S. 26 (1996). The Court held that the statutory
language imposes no such barrier and, therefore, that the INS is free to consider
any evidence of fraud as grounds for deportation. See id at 30.
187. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1994).
188. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33).
189. See Smith Opening Statement, supranote 10, at 1.
190. No departure documents are required for entry to the United States.
As a result, the INS has no idea how many people fail to leave when their visas
expire. One INS spokesman stated "You are talking about a huge number of
people .... There is no system to track them. We wouldn't even know where to
start looking for them." J.B. Cutler, To Combat Terrorism, Start by Enforcing the
ImmigrationLaws, STR TRIBUNE, Mar. 15, 1993, at lIA (quoting Duke Austin, INS

spokesman).
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INS should also institute deportation proceedings against each
alien who has utilized the fraudulent scheme to enter the United
States.
Currently, aliens are fully aware that once in this country
they are virtually "home free." 19 1 So long as the individual alien
is never caught by law enforcement for a crime that would be
punishable by deportation, even if the criminal organization is
prosecuted, their individual L visa is secure.
Finally, the criminal penalty for organizations convicted of
these fraudulent schemes should be commensurate with the
crime committed. The penalty for this crime should be increased
to reflect the fact that these criminal organizations are importing
trained criminal operatives into this country in order to expand
their base of operations.
By utilizing better measures to detect fraudulent applications
and expanding the penalties for individuals who participate in
these schemes, the INS will likely detect and punish more L visa
fraud offenders. However, if the organized crime groups originate
in Russia or China, punishing the individual offenders is unlikely
to solve the entire problem. Procedural changes, combined with
an international component, would provide a better, more
effective solution.
B. Solution #2: Use a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
to Stop the Proliferationof Organized Crime
No law enforcement agency, acting alone, has ever waged a
successful campaign against organized crime. 192 But the
collective approach is not without bureaucratic obstacles. In the
United States, it took law enforcement decades to join forces and
fight against domestic organized crime. The most comprehensive
solution would require the participation of the entire international
community. Although this is a laudable goal, the barriers to
developing such a comprehensive program would likely be
insurmountable. 19 3 On a smaller scale, however, the United

191. See Virtue Testimony, supranote 119, at 12.
192. See generally, KLEIN KNECHT, supra note 115, at 305 (discussing the
less-than-obvious difficulties facing law enforcement in the fight against organized

crime).
193. See Farah Hussain, Note, A FunctionalResponse to InternationalCrime:
An InternationalJustice Commission, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 755, 756 (1996). Such
barriers include the fact that international crime is not recognized by all nations
and that no central organization has been established to monitor enforcement of
this type of crime. Id.
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States could work with China and Russia to address the specific
problems presented by organized crime in those countries.
Traditionally, criminal law has been applied only at the
domestic level. 19 4 Due to a number of procedural barriers, no
transnational system of criminal law exists. 195 Countries have
formed bilateral treaties, however, that have proven
effective when
1
addressing specific transnational criminal issues. 9
Such a treaty could effectively address the problem of L visa
fraud in the United States and abroad. For example, associates
from one branch of the criminal organization in China may recruit
clients while another branch in the United States may apply for
the L visa certification. Should the INS discover the fraudulent
application, the agency will be able to prosecute those members of
the organization in the United States that applied for the visa. In
order to eliminate the criminal network behind the scheme,
however, the branch in the foreign country must also be stopped.
The United States should develop a specific framework with
both Russia and China to govern legal procedures for dealing with
transnational organized crime and information sharing devices.
Use of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) to coordinate
enforcement and cooperation between nations is one possible
solution.197 An MLAT will identify specific areas for cooperation
and also develop a legal procedure to transfer information and
198
witnesses between the two countries.
The United States signed its first MLAT in 1973 with
19 9
Switzerland to address the issue of illicit funds in Swiss banks.
The Swiss MLAT allowed United States law enforcement and
administrative agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, access to information normally restricted under
bank secrecy laws. 200 The Swiss MLAT was used to access the
bank records of members of organized crime charged with tax
evasion.
An MLAT to address the L visa fraud issue could be modeled
201
after a 1985 MLAT signed between the United States and Italy.

194. National sovereignty and the reluctance of domestic courts to
adjudicate international law are among the barriers to a transnational criminal
law system. See Vassalo, supranote 185, at 175.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197.
See HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEv F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 830 (1986).
198. See id199. Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973,
U.S.-Switz., art. 9, 27 U.S.T. 2019, 2035 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT].
200. See Vassalo, supra note 185, at 188.

201.

See Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9,

1982, U.S.- Italy [hereinafter Italian MLAT].
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The Italian MLAT dealt specifically with the issue of organized
crime and directed both countries to cooperate in: locating
persons, servicing of documents, document production, execution
of search and seizure requests, taking of testimony, and
2 2
transferring of persons. 0
In 1987, the Italian MLAT was an essential part in the
successful prosecution of the "Pizza Connection" case. 20 3 In this
case, the government convicted Gaetano Badalamenti, a former
chief of the Sicilian Mafia, and sixteen other organized crime
associates from Sicily and the United States for smuggling 1,650
pounds of heroin into the United States over five years. 20 4 Using
the Italian MLAT, Rudolf Giuliani, then the U.S. Attorney in
Manhattan, 20 5 was able to arrange for the live testimony of two
critical Italian nationals, Tommaso Buscetta and Salvatore
2 o6
Contorno.
Using an MLAT, the United States would have a better
chance of permanently halting the use of the L visa for illegal
immigration. The MLAT would allow better access to information
and witnesses critical to effective enforcement of immigration law.
And instead of a piecemeal approach, where individual fraud rings
are detected and prosecuted, the government could use an MLAT
20 7
to effectively wipe out the entire network.

VI. CONCLUSION
In 1970, Congress wanted to encourage foreign investment in
the United States and thought the L visa, with its flexible
provisions, would be an incentive for international businesses to
establish branch offices in the United States. As the global
marketplace becomes more important, transnational corporations
will continue to need the L visa to relocate personnel to the
United States.
While Congress accurately predicted the rise of the
transnational corporation, it failed to consider that those same

202. I& at art. 1, § 2 (a-g), 24 I.L.M. at 1539. Prior to MLATs, the two
countries were forced to use the cumbersome diplomatic process to gain
information for criminal proceedings. See Vassalo, supra note 180, at 190.
203.
See Vassalo, supra note 185, at 191.
204.
See KLEIN KNECHT, supranote 115, at 137.
205.
See id. at 288.
206.
See Vassalo, supra note 185, at 192. Without the MLAT, Italy could
have agreed to produce the witnesses, but would not have been under an
obligation to do so. See i&L
207.
See id at 195.
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forces would also lead to a revolution in transnational criminal
organizations.
The evidence clearly indicates at least two
multinational criminal conspiracies consistently misuse the L visa
to facilitate illegal immigration.
The solution is not to eliminate the L visa. However, in order
to maintain the integrity of the United States immigration system,
individuals such as the fictional Chinese entrepreneur Sun Qi in
the novel The Wrath of God, cannot be allowed to manipulate the
L visa for an enormous profit.
Through a combination of
procedural changes to the L visa, and an effective agreement with
foreign jurisdictions, the United States can strike the necessary
balance between a flexible visa for international businesses and
control of its non-immigration system.
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